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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-4255 
____________ 
 
EDWIN R. JONAS III; 
BLACKTAIL MOUNTAIN RANCH CO., LLC, a 
Nevada Limited Liability Company 
                            Appellants 
  
v. 
  
              NANCY D. GOLD, ESQ., LINDA B JONAS; CHARNEY, CHARNEY & 
KARAPOUSIS, P.A.; ADLER, SACHAROW, GOLD, TAYLOR, KEYSER & 
HAGNER, A Professional Corporation  
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 1-13-cv-02949) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 16, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 23, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 This appeal is Edwin Jonas III’s latest attempt — in a series of cases spanning 
twenty-five years and invoking the jurisdiction of several state and federal courts — to 
avoid paying alimony and child support.  Before the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, Edwin brought common-law fraud and § 1983 claims against his 
ex-wife, Linda Jonas, and her divorce lawyer, Nancy Gold.  Edwin also brought legal 
malpractice and conversion claims against Gold and the law firms of Charny, Charny, & 
Karapousis, P.A. (“Charny”) and Adler, Sacharow, Gold, Taylor, Keyser, and Hanger, 
P.C. (“Adler”).  In an order dated September 30, 2014, the District Court dismissed all 
claims against Linda and Gold and granted summary judgment in favor of Charny and 
Adler.1  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 
summarize the facts relevant to our decision.  Edwin and Linda Jonas divorced in 1990.  
Edwin repeatedly failed to meet his support obligations, and a New Jersey Superior Court 
imposed a constructive trust with Linda as trustee and Gold as custodian.  In 2002, Edwin 
moved in Florida state court to set aside a judgment for unpaid alimony on grounds of 
negligence and conversion, alleging that Linda and Gold had misappropriated trust assets.  
See Appendix (“App.”) 93.  That case was dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  (Ex. to Decl. of Edwin R. Jonas III Opp. Motions on the Pleadings & 
Summary Judgment, Docket No. 48 (“Jonas Decl.”), at 64-65). 
                                              
1 The District Court also denied Edwin’s cross-motions for summary judgment and Linda 
Jonas’s motion for Edwin to be declared a vexatious litigant. 
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 In May 2006, the New Jersey Superior Court Chancery Division entered a 
judgment against Edwin for unpaid child support, alimony, and other obligations.  In a 
separate judgment, it applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and dismissed Edwin’s 
cross-motions for relief, based on alleged misappropriations of trust funds, until such 
time as Edwin posted a bond to cover outstanding judgments and appeared personally in 
New Jersey court.  The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments.  Jonas v. Jonas, No. 
FM-04-259-89, 2008 WL 239069, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29, 2008). 
 Linda domesticated, or obtained recognition of, the May 2006 judgment for 
unpaid alimony and child support in Florida and Montana.  Edwin opposed her attempts 
to enforce the judgment in those jurisdictions, alleging that the judgment was obtained by 
fraud in that Linda and Gold denied having misappropriated trust funds. 
 Following the unfavorable termination of several of his suits, Edwin brought this 
putative fraud, malpractice, and civil rights action.  The District Court dismissed all 
claims for failure to comply with the statute of limitations and for lack of jurisdiction.2  It 
                                              
2 In a footnote, the District Court found the domestic relations exception to diversity 
jurisdiction also barred Edwin’s suit.  “The modern rule, as expressed in Ankenbrandt, 
provides ‘that the domestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the 
issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.’”  Matusow v. Trans-County 
Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 
504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)); see also Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006) 
(“[O]nly ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees’ remain outside federal 
jurisdictional bounds.”) (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704).  While Edwin’s suit 
affects rights held under child support and alimony orders, it does not explicitly seek 
modification of those orders.  Several of Edwin’s claims are against individuals and firms 
that were not parties to the domestic relations decrees.  See Matusow, 545 F.3d at 247 
(“The domestic relations exception generally does not apply to third parties.”).  We need 
not decide the issue, however, because the District Court’s order can be affirmed on other 
grounds.   
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found that Edwin’s claims were effectively an appeal from the May 2006 judgments — 
an appeal which, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal courts had no power to 
hear.  Jonas v. Gold, No. 13-cv-2949, 2014 WL 4854484, at *7-12 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 
2014).  The District Court dismissed the malpractice claims for the additional reasons that 
Edwin failed to allege circumstances that would allow him to bring a malpractice claim 
against lawyers who did not represent him, id. at *9,  and failed to submit an affidavit of 
merit as required by New Jersey statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-26-29.  Id.  It 
dismissed the § 1983 claims on the ground that none of the defendants were state actors.  
Id. at *11-12.  Edwin timely appealed. 
II.3 
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal district courts of jurisdiction over 
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
3 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a).  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.  Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  In so doing, “[w]e take as true all the 
factual allegations of the [complaint] and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from them, . . . but we disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause 
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 
F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  “[W]hen the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged,” the claim has “facial plausibility” and the complaint 
will survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 
(2009).  We review grants of summary judgment de novo, Montone v. City of Jersey 
City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013), viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party and affirming only where the moving party has established there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact.  Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
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court review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  The doctrine “arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 
which states in relevant part that ‘[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest 
court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court.’”  In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257).  
“Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of review of the United States 
District Courts, the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not intend to empower 
District Courts to review state court decisions . . . .”  Id.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
thus precludes federal district courts from hearing cases “if the federal claim was actually 
litigated in state-court prior to the filing of the federal action or . . . if the federal claim is 
inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only 
be predicated upon a conviction that the state-court was wrong.”  Id. at 581.  “State and 
federal claims are inextricably intertwined ‘(1) when in order to grant the federal plaintiff 
the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was 
erroneously entered [or] (2) when the federal court must . . . take action that would render 
[the state court’s] judgment ineffectual.’”  ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Intern. Corp., 366 F.3d 
205, 211 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 
411, 421 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted)). 
A. 
 Edwin’s primary argument on appeal is that the monetary judgment entered in 
May 2006 was not final because it was a default judgment entered without prejudice.  He 
relies on the Superior Court’s instruction, echoed by other New Jersey courts, that his 
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motions could be heard if he posted a sufficient bond and appeared personally in New 
Jersey.  See Jonas v. Jonas, 2008 WL 239069, at *2 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 30, 
2008).   
 Edwin previously litigated this precise issue before the United States District 
Court for the District of Montana.  That District Court found that the New Jersey 
judgments were final.  Jonas v. Jonas, No. 13-cv-90, 2014 WL 978099, at *5 (D. Mont. 
Mar. 12, 2014).  Perhaps realizing that collateral estoppel could preclude this Court from 
revisiting the Montana District Court’s finding on the issue, Edwin argues that a federal 
district court sitting in Montana is not entitled to deference on the subject of the finality 
of New Jersey judgments.4  This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel.  But even if we were to review the finality of the 2006 judgments de 
                                              
4 Edwin also claims that the District Court erred in taking judicial notice of several prior 
opinions in this interminable saga, including the Montana District Court decision, 
because those opinions contained, in his view, various errors of law and fact.  He further 
claims that the District Court violated his due process rights by failing to give him a 
hearing on his objection to the defendants’ request for judicial notice.  Both of these 
contentions are meritless.  The District Court was entitled to take judicial notice of prior 
opinions to establish the procedural history of the case, see Southern Cross Overseas 
Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that courts “may take judicial notice of [other courts’] opinion[s]—not for the truth of the 
facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to 
reasonable dispute over its authenticity”), which revealed, among other things, that the 
finality issue was already litigated.  The District Court added that were it to consider the 
issue de novo, it would agree with the prior analysis anyway.  See Jonas v. Gold, 2014 
WL 4854844, at *2 n.6 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2014).  As to Edwin’s due process argument, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(e) does not require a formal hearing but an opportunity to 
be heard.  See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 251 n.28 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding 
Rule 201(e) was satisfied when Defendant was heard as to propriety of taking judicial 
notice in the course of a Daubert hearing).  Edwin received such an opportunity at a 
hearing on July 29, 2014.  (See Tr. of Hr’g dated July 29, 2014 at 35 (listing Jonas’s 
demand for hearing under 201(e) among the topics of the hearing)). The District Court 
committed no errors in connection with its use of judicial notice. 
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novo, we would agree with United States District Court for the District of Montana.  
Inviting Edward to renew his challenge under specified conditions did not render the 
2006 judgment non-final.  Otherwise, Linda’s ability to enforce her judgment would 
depend on Edwin making an unlikely appearance in New Jersey Superior Court.  Edwin 
in fact appealed the 2006 judgments, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  Jonas v. 
Jonas, 2008 WL 239069, at *2 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29, 2008).  Moreover, after 
the Appellate Division ruled against him, Edwin filed motions to vacate several orders, 
including the 2006 judgment.  The Superior Court denied these motions, the Appellate 
Division affirmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification.  See Jonas v. 
Jonas, 210 N.J. 109 (2012).  Edwin subsequently conceded in a Montana Bankruptcy 
action that “[a]ll appellate avenues in New Jersey have been exhausted and no further 
appeals are possible.”  In re Jonas, 2012 WL 2921016, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mont. July 17, 
2012).  We agree that “[f]or all intents and purposes, [the 2006 judgments] are final 
judgments.”  Jonas v. Jonas, 2014 WL 978099, at *5 (D. Mont. Mar. 12, 2014). 
B. 
 Edwin’s secondary argument against the application of Rooker-Feldman is that his 
current suit is not inextricably intertwined with the 2006 judgment.  In particular, he 
insists that this suit does not concern state-court judgments but rather independent frauds 
committed to obtain them.  But even without identifying the state-court judgment as his 
injury, the fact remains that Edwin’s claims of misappropriation of trust funds are the 
same ones he brought before the New Jersey Superior Court, and hearing those claims 
would require us to nullify the Superior Court’s application of the fugitive disentitlement 
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doctrine.  Because Edwin’s requested relief would “render [the state court’s judgment] 
ineffectual,” Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at 421 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original), the 
claims are inextricably intertwined, and we are divested of jurisdiction. 
III. 
 Edwin argues that the District Court’s application of the statute of limitations was 
in error because he did not have actual knowledge of the defendants’ fraud until 2008 and 
the statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled under the doctrine of 
fraudulent concealment. 
 Under New Jersey law, the statute of limitations for personal injury tort claims is 
two years.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 14-2.5  The statute of limitations for tortious injury to 
real or personal property is six years.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 14-1.  The injuries alleged in 
Edwin’s Complaint arose, at the latest, from the judgment in May 2006.  This suit was 
filed in May 2013.  Therefore, unless some basis for tolling applies, Edwin’s claims are 
untimely. 
 The discovery rule postpones the accrual date of a cause of action “until the 
injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should 
have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.”  Lopez v. Swyer, 300 
A.2d 563, 565 (N.J. 1973).  Here, Edwin has been alleging fraud and misappropriation of 
trust funds against Linda and her attorneys since at least 2002.  (See Jonas Decl., at 41-44 
                                              
5 This statute applies to § 1983 claims as well.  Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dept., 
892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The statute of limitations for any Section 1983 claim is 
the state statute which limits actions for personal injuries.  In New Jersey that statute is 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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(alleging that Linda misappropriated and squandered trust assets and that Gold breached 
her fiduciary duty by disbursing funds to Linda without authorization)); see also App. 94 
(describing the suit above).  He made similar accusations in his cross-motions during the 
New Jersey enforcement action in 2006.  Even if, as the Complaint alleges, Gold only 
confirmed the fraud in 2008, App. 53, Edwin was aware of the basis for his claim long 
before that.  The cause of action was not newly discovered. 
 For the same reason, Edwin cannot make out a case for equitable tolling.  “Unlike 
the discovery rule which suspends the limitation period because the plaintiff is unaware 
of [his cause of action], equitable tolling of a statute of limitations occurs . . . ‘where the 
complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the 
filing deadline to pass.’”  Villalobos v. Fava, 775 A.2d 700, 707 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001) (quoting Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside, 693 A.2d 1248, 1258 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).  Edwin’s extensive litigation history demonstrates that, for 
better or worse, he has never been induced to believe he lacked a cause of action.  Cf.  
Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471, 487 (3d Cir. 2000) (the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment requires a plaintiff to “show that he actually was ‘mis[led] . . . into thinking 
that he d[id] not have a cause of action.’” (quoting Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 
624 (3d Cir.1993))).  Edwin’s claims are all time-barred.6 
                                              
6  Because we conclude that Edwin’s claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman and the 
statute of limitations, we need not reach the appellees’ argument that Edwin’s 
malpractice claims fail for lack of a certificate of merit.  Nor do we need to reach the 
substance of Edwin’s § 1983 claims.  We note, however, that Edwin cites no authority for 
the proposition that the court-appointed trustee of a private trust is, ipso facto, a state 
actor. 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
